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Choice of Subcontractor in Markets with 
Asymmetric Information: Reputation and Price 
Effects 
Abstract 
Purpose -Buyers assessing bids from suppliers of experience services face 
both an adverse selection and a potential moral hazard problem. The purpose of this 
study is to examine (1) the relative importance of various signals of supplier 
reputation conveying information about unobserved supplier quality, which is 
important for identifying the best tender; and whether price is contingent on (2) 
supplier reputation, and (3) on buyer’s quality sensitiveness in a competitive bidding 
situation.  
Design/methodology/approach - This study builds on a conjoint experiment 
where 19 contractors consider alternative scenarios representing tenders from 
subcontractors of plumbing services. In the scenarios the subcontractors differ on their 
reputation and price variables, while the contractors differ in their quality 
sensitiveness. Multiple regressions analyzes the contingent price effects. 
Findings – Although low price is generally important for subcontractor 
selection, quality sensitive buyers are willing to pay subcontractors a price premium to 
prevent quality debasement. On the other hand, despite the combined significance of 
supplier reputation on choice, buyers are not willing to pay price premiums to 
suppliers with a quality reputation.  
Research limitations/implications – Conjoint studies produce multiple cases 
but the underlying sample is limited. Therefore, this study should be regarded as 
preliminary and a basis for further validation on larger samples.  
Practical implications – In competitive bidding situations, suppliers with 
strong quality reputations may benefit most by low price offers. Thus, suppliers with a 
strong reputation should achieve profitability through a volume premium rather than a 
price premium effect. Suppliers opting for price premiums should target the quality 
sensitive segment of the market. 
Originality/value – In contrast to previous findings in B2B brand equity 
studies, but in line with findings in information economics, this study suggests that 
suppliers with a reputation for quality will not receive price premiums. The results 
indicate that in bidding contexts in B2B markets, the reputation variables may enhance 
rather than reduce buyers’ price sensitivity, because supplier reputation increases low 
price credibility.  
Key words: Supplier selection, competitive bidding, asymmetric information, 
reputation, price premium, B2B marketing 
Paper type: Research paper 
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Choice of Subcontractor in Markets with 
Asymmetric Information: Reputation and Price 
Effects 
Introduction 
In project markets, as building construction, contractors usually select 
subcontractors through a competitive bidding process (Blombäck and Axelsson, 2007; 
Eccles, 1981; Holt et al., 1995). Motivated by the attractiveness of the contract and 
fear of losing to competitors, subcontractors are likely to offer their lowest possible 
prices and best quality to gain customer preference (Anderson and Narus, 1999). 
Although contractors define strict task specifications in their tenders to ease 
subcontractor comparisons (Blombäck and Axelsson, 2007), non-contractable quality 
aspects of the suppliers’ offerings still remain and make choice of supplier difficult 
(Edlin and Hermalin, 2000; Wuyts et al., 2009; Zolkiewsky et. al. 2007). In fact, 
uncertainty about quality is a widespread and important characteristic of markets for 
most firms’ goods and services (Shapiro, 1982). Theoretically, when quality is 
uncertain and only can be assessed after use, as for services such as plumbing and 
electrical work, the buyers face two problems; that of adverse selection (Akerlof, 
1970) and a potential moral hazard problem (Bergen et al., 1992; Shapiro, 1982). This 
context means that buyers may have pre-purchase problems in distinguishing between 
high and low quality suppliers and post-purchase problems in detecting contract 
compliance. Unfortunately, both adverse selection and moral hazard problems are 
likely to be worse where prices are low (Akerlof, 1970; Rao and Monroe, 1996). 
Rather than getting high-quality suppliers at a low price, buyers opting for the lowest 
prices risk ending up with low-quality supplies (Akerlof, 1970; Dyer, 1996; Holt et al. 
1995). Still, acceptance of lowest bid is the dominating principle for bid acceptance in 
the construction industry despite emphasizing supplier quality would help identifying 
the best tender (Hatush and Skitmore, 1998; Holt et al. 1995). 
This study draws on insights from the economics of information literature and 
focuses on selection of subcontractors to the building construction industry (in 
particular, subcontractors of water, ventilation and sanitary, hereafter plumbing 
services). However, the findings may provide insights to any industry where 
asymmetric information on supplier quality exists. One objective with this study is to 
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provide a more nuanced picture of selection criteria for suppliers with 
experience attributes in a competitive bidding situation by examining the relative 
importance of buyers’ previous experience with the subcontractor, subcontractors’ 
brand credibility and references, subcontractors’ CSR certification, and price. These 
variables are various signals of supplier reputation conveying information about 
unobserved supplier quality (Kirmani and Rao, 2000), which is important for 
identifying the best tender (Hatush and Skitmore, 1998).  
Second, the study examines to what extent price is contingent on supplier 
reputations (Aaker, 1991; Rao, 1993). In a survey among its members, the Norwegian 
construction industry has identified brand and reputation building as strategies to 
improve the industry’s profitability (Espelien and Reve, 2007). Empirical studies in 
business-to-business marketing (e.g., Bendixen et al., 2004) suggest that suppliers 
with a quality reputation should receive price premiums. In contrast, findings from 
economics of information show that buyers will not pay price premiums to suppliers 
with a quality reputation (Rao and Bergen 1992). Third, assuming that B2B 
purchasing managers are both price and quality sensitive, this study explores whether 
price is contingent on purchasers’ quality sensitiveness. Recent research in 
construction concludes that researchers and practitioners have realized that lowest 
price is not the promising approach to attain lowest project costs (Darvish et al., 
2009).  
This study builds on a conjoint experiment where contractors’ purchasing 
managers consider alternative scenarios representing tenders from subcontractors of 
plumbing services that differ on their reputation and price variables, while the 
contractors differ in their quality sensitiveness. The findings indicate that a balanced 
picture of the selection criteria for subcontractors to building construction projects is 
warranted. Although low price is generally important for subcontractor selection, the 
results indicate that quality sensitive buyers are willing to pay subcontractors a price 
premium when poor quality may cause economic losses to the contractors. 
Furthermore, the combined effect of the reputation variables outweighs price. Still, 
buyers are not willing to pay price premiums to suppliers with a quality reputation; a 
finding contradicting extant B2B brand equity literature. 
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The rest of the article is organized as follows. The following section 
presents the conceptual framework including hypotheses. The next section describes 
the research design and the empirical tests. Finally, the article discusses the 
implications of the findings, the limitations of the study, and possible topics for further 
research.   
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
Choice consists of selecting the optimal subcontractor balancing quality and 
price (Hatush and Skitmore, 1998; Wuyts et al. 2009) while reducing personal and 
organizational risk (Homburg et al., 2010). Consider a contractor assessing tenders 
from various subcontractors, some already known to the contractor and others 
unknown (Blombäck and Axelsson, 2007). Assuming information asymmetry exists, 
the buyer will have difficulty in distinguishing between high and low-quality 
suppliers. In the context at hand (plumbing services) where the suppliers can adapt 
their quality levels both to the specifications of the bid and during service delivery, the 
choice also involves a potential moral hazard problem for the buyer (Mishra et al., 
1998; Shapiro, 1982). For example, when a contractor has chosen a specific supplier 
of services with experience attributes (Nelson, 1970) the supplier has the capability to 
change the quality level during service delivery. Because quality reductions provide 
immediate cost savings and are difficult to detect the supplier also might be motivated 
to undersupply quality by using substandard components or unskilled workers 
(www.HousingBottom.com, 2010; Mishra et al., 1998). There are examples that 
suppliers in the construction industry violate general CSR obligations by paying their 
workers below tariff wages, offering poor working conditions, using illegal workers, 
or not paying taxes to cut costs further and underbid competitors, thus undermining 
the industry’s profitability and reputation (Gedde-Dahl, 2010; Sæter, 2010). 
Sellers of experience services can reduce the information asymmetry by 
investing in various signals of quality (Kirmani and Rao, 2000).1 Signals are actions 
                                                 
1 More specifically, adverse selection problems are resolved by using signals, whereas moral 
hazard problems are resolved by using incentives (Mishra et al., 1998, Rao and Bergen, 1992, Rao and 
Monroe, 1996). However, adverse selection and moral hazard models apply the same principles for 
rewarding honesty and punishing dishonesty, and can therefore be analyzed simultaneously (Picard, 
1987, Rao and Monroe, 1996).  
 6 
that parties take to reveal their true characteristics (e.g., quality level). Signals 
incur costs or potential costs, or potential revenue losses to high-quality firms should 
they not fulfil their claims of high quality, whereas quality fulfilment will be rewarded 
with enhanced revenues (Homburg et al., 2010; Kirmani and Rao, 2000). In contrast, 
low-quality firms will lose money by signalling, since low-quality firms will not 
recover the costs through repeat business. Therefore, buyers can infer the suppliers’ 
quality-level from their signalling strategy (Kirmani and Rao, 2000). More 
specifically, sellers may build a credible quality reputation through investments in 
previous quality work observed through buyers’ experience (Blombäck and Axelsson, 
2007; Liebeskind and Rumelt, 1989), in brand names and references (Akerlof, 1970, 
Kotler and Pfoertsch, 2007; Wuyts et al., 2009), third party certification (Akerlof, 
1970; Rubin, 1990), and through charging price premiums (Kirmani and Rao, 2000). 
For example, the Norwegian construction industry has introduced a particular CSR-
certification program for its members to increase supplier CSR credibility. Figure 1 
shows the conceptual model. 
Figure 1 here 
Previous Experience 
In the bidding-process, buyers receive bids both from unknown and previously 
known suppliers. One way for buyers to overcome the problem of information 
asymmetry is to select suppliers with a reputation for quality (Blombäck and 
Axelsson, 2007; Shapiro, 1982, 1983). Previously manufactured products and the 
history of delivery precision, as well as positive experiences with key personnel are 
examples of factors that potential customers consider in subcontractor selection 
processes (Blombäck and Axelsson, 2007; Shapiro, 1983; Wuyts et al, 2009). 
Reputation formation is a type of signalling activity: the investments in high-quality 
products, services and procedures in previous periods serve as signals of high-quality 
performance during the current period (Blombäck and Axelsson, 2007; Shapiro, 
1983). Rather than using an unknown supplier, buyers use their previous experience 
with suppliers and repurchase as mechanisms to assure quality (Blombäck and 
Axelsson, 2007; Liebeskind and Rumelt, 1989; Nelson, 1970). 
Hypothesis 1: Previous positive experience has a positive effect on the likelihood of 
choosing the subcontractor.  
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Company Brand Credibility and References 
When buyers cannot acquire information about quality directly through 
experience (Nelson, 1970), a subcontractor’s company brand name could convey 
information about unobservable quality (Akerlof, 1970; Blombäck and Axelsson, 
2007; Kotler and Pfoertsch, 2007). More specifically, Kotler and Pfoertsch (2007, p. 
358) note, “Brands in B2B markets are a guarantee of quality, origin and performance, 
thereby increasing the perceived value to the customer and reducing the risk and 
complexity involved in the buying decisions.” Basically, the supplier’s company brand 
name assures the buyer that the supplier is the responsible party should quality not 
meet expectations. Therefore, loss or damage to the reputation of the subcontractor’s 
brand name is likely to put future profits at risk, and thereby increase the costs of 
cheating (Rao and Monroe, 1996). 
However, with no other cues than the company brand name, the mere name 
conveys limited information about supplier quality, although dissemination of brand 
names and logos without developing comprehensive brand identities is the focus of 
many B2B firms’ branding strategies (Homburg et al., 2010). As a solution, references 
from other buyers that have used the supplier previously may serve the purpose of 
building a credible company brand name (Helm and Salminen, 2010; Salminen and 
Möller, 2006; Üstuner and Godes, 2006). Firstly, prior investments in consistent 
quality for other buyers serve as a credible signal of quality to the current buyer 
(Shapiro, 1982, 1983; Helm and Salminen, 2010; Kotler and Pfoertsch, 2007; Wuyts 
et. al., 2009). Secondly, using reputable customers as references parallels the logic in 
the brand alliance literature that well-known, strong brands convey information about 
unobservable quality in their brand allies (Rao and Ruekert, 1994). For example, 
Blombäck and Axelsson (2007) find that the reputation of large and prestigious 
customers positively affects the corporate image of subcontractors. In turn, 
subcontractors’ corporate brand image, the impressions of the company, is used as a 
proxy for subcontractor quality.  
Hypothesis 2: Subcontractor’s company brand credibility supported by well-
established references has a positive effect on the likelihood of choosing the 
subcontractor. 
 8 
Certification of Corporate Social Responsibility 
Supplier quality is measureable not only by the quality of craftsmanship in the 
service delivery but also by the quality of the underlying processes for the bid, such as 
corporate social responsibility. Corporate social responsibility involves business 
operations that interfere with established social and human rights such as avoiding 
taxes, underpaying workers, or denying workers’ rights to join unions (Vaaland and 
Heide, 2005). Measuring the quality of the underlying processes is particularly 
relevant where price is an important selection criterion. As an illustration, some critics 
accuse Wal-Mart of being able to offer its low prices due to underpaying its 
employees and offering poor working conditions (Palazzo and Basu, 2007). Similarly, 
in the Norwegian construction industry, some suppliers pay illegal workers at rates 
below the minimum wage for construction and also withhold compulsory taxes in 
order to cut costs and underbid on selling price (Berglund, 2008). As such, those 
companies are cheating on their corporate social responsibility promise in order to 
achieve a competitive advantage. Since cheating on corporate social responsibility is 
difficult to spot, a buyer receiving a bid cannot know whether the supplier is honest or 
not in this respect (Berglund, 2008).  
A growing number of companies emphasize ethics and corporate social 
responsibility when choosing suppliers (Biong et al, 2010). For example, large pension 
funds now penalize companies that harm the health of their employees, fail to respect 
human rights and otherwise renege on their corporate social responsibility because bad 
supplier CSR-reputation transmits to the buyer (e.g., Biong et al., 2010; Blombäck and 
Axelsson, 2007). In general, cheating on corporate social responsibility is both an 
adverse selection and moral hazard problem and can be solved with the same 
mechanisms as when product quality is uncertain. Many industries have developed 
certification programs (Akerlof, 1970; Shapiro, 1982) guaranteeing a certain quality 
level. Examples are fair trade certificates, vessel classification programs, or ISO 
certification. Accordingly, the Norwegian construction industry has implemented a 
corporate social responsibility certification program for suppliers. However, 
participation in this program is voluntary. To obtain certification the supplier 
undergoes a due diligence process from a third party and pays a yearly membership 
fee. These processes are costly to the supplier and, therefore, have a signalling effect. 
The buyer knows that cheating on corporate social responsibility will exclude the 
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supplier from certification and the investments will be lost. Hence, it is in the 
supplier’s interest to be honest and capitalize on the investment because buyers are 
expected to prefer certified suppliers.  
Hypothesis 3: Certification of corporate social responsibility has a positive effect on 
the likelihood of choosing the subcontractor. 
Price  
Price may play multiple roles when purchasing products and services (Rao and 
Monroe 1988). Traditional economic theory suggests that price has a negative impact 
on choice since higher prices have a negative impact on buyers’ budgets. The practice 
of introducing competitive bidding to determine the selling price underlines this 
perspective (Burt and Boyett, 1979; Holt et al., 1995; Wuyts et al., 2009). However, 
when quality is uncertain the effect of price on buyer choice may not be that simple. In 
some circumstances, quality sensitive buyers may be willing to pay a higher price than 
the normal competitive price, or a price premium, in order to receive high quality 
(Klein and Leffler, 1981). It is also important that the buyers spread the price 
premiums over several purchase occasions, or premiums are unlikely to motivate 
sellers to provide high quality. In project markets, buyers are not committed to 
repurchase once the project is completed. If then the buyer pays the entire premium 
during this first transaction the seller has little incentive to be honest, since the threat 
of future profit losses disappears (Rao and Monroe, 1996). In that case, rational 
quality sensitive buyers may take into consideration that profit-maximizing sellers 
might claim high quality but provide low quality when quality is unobservable prior to 
purchase. Therefore, the buyer may be willing to pay only a low price consistent with 
their expectations of low quality (Rao and Monroe, 1996). 
Hypothesis 4: A negative relationship exists between price and the likelihood of 
choosing the subcontractor. 
Price and Reputation 
The underlying premise for this study is that buyers generally prefer high-
quality suppliers and want the suppliers to be honest and supply high quality during all 
transactions. The economics of information literature suggests buyers to pay suppliers 
a price premium for this purpose (Rao, 1993; Klein and Leffler, 1981). A price 
premium is the difference between a “super-high” price and the competitive price for 
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high quality output.2 This price premium provides the suppliers with above-
average profits and is a monetary incentive to deliver high quality (see Rao and 
Monroe (1996) for an extensive review of causes and consequences of price 
premiums). In short, the buyer offers the supplier a “super-high” price for high quality, 
and offers to pay this extra high price every time they do business as long as the 
supplier does not debase quality. If the supplier debases quality, the buyer will punish 
the supplier by stopping buying and the supplier loses the supernormal profit (Klein 
and Leffler, 1981; Rao, 1993).  
However, when the supplier already has provided a “hostage” against quality 
debasement through investments in a reputation for quality (previous high-quality 
deliveries, company brand name, and CSR-certification), is it then necessary for the 
buyer to pay the seller extra to be honest? Early works in economics of information 
(Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1982, 1983) supported by empirical studies (Ba and 
Pavlou, 2002; Erdem et al., 2006; Mishra et al., 1998) say yes. Sellers with a credible 
reputation for quality will receive price premiums as a return on their reputation 
investments. Although not building on the economics of information logic, empirical 
B2B brand equity studies also suggest that suppliers with a quality reputation (or 
brand equity) will receive price premiums (Bendixen et al., 2004; Hutton; 1997; 
Persson, 2010; Rauyruen and Miller, 2009).  
In contrast, another stream of the literature answer no to the question above; 
when suppliers have developed a quality reputation there is no need for buyers to pay 
them price premiums for being honest. (e.g., Rao, 1993; Rao and Monroe, 1996). This 
is exactly what Rao and Bergen (1992) found. Reputable sellers received lower price 
premiums than did less reputable sellers. They explained their finding by arguing that 
reputable sellers received lower price premiums because were they to cheat on quality, 
their reputations would be damaged and their future income put at risk. A seller that 
intends to stay in the market has every incentive to deliver high and consistent quality, 
because future sales will not occur if quality promises are not true (Kirmani and Rao, 
2000). Therefore, reputable sellers are less likely to cheat and they will receive lower 
                                                 
2 It should be noted that price premiums are conceptually different from premium prices. 
Premium prices are considerably above average market prices, reflecting the higher costs of producing 
high quality, but premium prices may not necessarily provide profit to sellers (Rao and Bergen, 1992). 
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price premiums to keep their high-quality promise. The higher the 
subcontractors’ investments in reputation, the lower the need for buyers to pay them 
price premiums.  
Hypothesis 5: The negative effect of price on the likelihood of choosing the supplier is 
stronger at higher levels of supplier reputation in terms of (a) previous experience (b) 
company brand credibility, and (c) certification (that is, there will be a negative 
interaction effect between price and the reputation variables on the likelihood of 
choosing the subcontractor). 
Price and Quality Sensitiveness 
Generally, the literature assumes that quality-sensitive buyers are more willing 
to pay price premiums than those who are less quality-sensitive (Rao, 1993). For 
example, the need to pay price premiums to ensure good quality increases if inferior 
quality from the supplier will lead to monetary losses for the buyer (Rao and Bergen, 
1992). Leakage due to low-quality plumbing is the most serious and frequent damage 
to new buildings. Therefore, in order to prevent leakages, high-quality work is 
essential and the price premium will serve as an insurance against losses caused by 
low quality. Rao and Bergen (1992) suggest, based on their findings that when quality 
sensitiveness for experience products increases, the propensity to offer price premiums 
also increases.  
Hypothesis 6: The risk of monetary losses caused by low quality services from the 
supplier positively moderates the negative effect of price on the likelihood of choosing 
the subcontractor. 
Methods  
Research Context and Sampling Frame 
A conjoint analysis experiment among 19 contractors in the capital city region 
of Norway was used to gather information for this study. In practice this means nearly 
100% of the total population within that region. However, this regional population 
could be viewed as a subset of the total Norwegian population of contractors. Within 
each contractor organization, the person responsible for selection of subcontractors of 
plumbing services was identified. Key informant ability was validated by willingness 
to participate and by influence on and experience and competence in selection of this 
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kind of suppliers (Campbell, 1955). The conjoint task was supplemented by 
a self- administered questionnaire for information on the informant and various 
aspects of the buying task. The research context, contractors’ choice of subcontractors 
of plumbing services to their building projects, was chosen for several reasons.  
Firstly, these services have a particular influence on the overall quality of the 
final building. For example, leakage caused by poor-quality plumbing is the most 
frequent cause of quality problems in new buildings (Ingvaldsen, 2008; Ramsdal, 
2008). In Norway costs caused by poor-quality work on new buildings and 
renovations are estimated to be 9 percent of total turnover or 28 percent of added 
value (Ingvaldsen, 2008). These numbers compare well to other European countries. 
Secondly, reviews of academic journals, trade journals, industry reports, and 
initial discussions with managers from subcontractors, contractors, and trade 
organizations suggested that the focal variables all manifest themselves in this setting 
to variable degrees. For instance, contractors traditionally choose subcontractors to 
construction projects based on a competitive bidding procedure, emphasizing price as 
an important choice criterion, though at the same time quality may suffer (Holt et al., 
1995). To overcome problems with pre-selection quality evaluations, contractor 
managers emphasized the importance of previous personal experience with 
subcontractors’ key employees in the consideration and choice processes. A 
comprehensive study on the Norwegian construction industry revealed poor 
profitability to be a problem for further development. The report, based on a survey 
among the industry members, identified brand and reputation building as promising 
strategies to improve the industry’s profitability (Espelien and Reve, 2007). 
Particularly, the qualitative prestudy suggested previous successful projects and 
prestigious references to be strong signals of reputation and brand credibility. Finally, 
in this industry severe cases of social dumping and illegal work in order to cut costs 
have been observed, while also buyers have been accused of unethical buying 
behavior by selecting corporate irresponsible suppliers to achieve low-cost purchases. 
As a solution to this problem, the industry has introduced a special certification 
program where suppliers have to undergo a diligence process to ensure that they pay 
tariff wages, taxes, and generally operate in a social responsible way.  
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When organizational buyers select suppliers in a new task or 
modified rebuy situation, this selection is usually based on an evaluation of bids and 
proposals from a number of potential candidates (Dwyer and Tanner, 2006). A 
conjoint task very realistically mimics a contractor’s decision problem when assessing 
tenders and choosing subcontractor to a building construction project (Wathne et. al., 
2001; Wuyts et al., 2009). The conjoint design also has important advantages for 
estimating the relative importance of price and reputation variables in influencing 
preferences. The conjoint task was designed to describe the situation faced by a 
contractor who had to select a subcontractor for a construction project and make a 
choice based on the joint consideration of price and reputation attributes. Managers 
were asked to envision a task in which their company had been appointed as main 
contractor for a residential building project of 30 high-quality apartments and where 
the manager was assigned the responsibility of selecting a subcontractor for the overall 
plumbing solutions. The instruction emphasized that the total responsibility for the 
project included completion of the project by the due date, keeping to budgeted total 
costs, and minimizing defects on the finished building. As such, overall quality was an 
underlying assumption for the choice task. A conjoint analysis also is closely related 
to traditional experimentation (Hair et al.1995). As such, this method follows the 
suggestions of Rao and Monroe (1996) to conduct a behavioral experiment to test 
tradeoffs between reputation and price in a choice situation.  
Development of Conjoint Scenarios 
In developing the conjoint scenarios, the procedure as described by Wathne et 
al. (2001) was followed. Initially both the literature on supplier selection processes in 
the construction field and the trade press was consulted. Subsequently, personal 
interviews were conducted with key managers in the trade associations for contractors 
and for plumbing suppliers, as well as with two major contractors and one major 
plumbing company. From these exploratory investigations 16 conjoint scenarios (four 
factors each with two levels) were developed. These were subsequently tested on one 
business manager from the contractor side in a personal interview. This pretest 
revealed no major problems with completing the conjoint task.  
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Measures 
The four factors of the conjoint task and the levels of each are as follows: (1) 
prior experience (with the subcontractor’s key personnel), (2) company brand 
credibility supported with references, (3) certification (of corporate social 
responsibility), and (4) price. The Appendix gives a more detailed description of the 
factors and levels. 
Moderator variable 
In addition to the conjoint variables described above, one moderator variable - 
buyers’ quality sensitiveness in relation to potential losses caused by inferior supplier 
quality - that could potentially influence the price variable was included (Rao and 
Monroe, 1996; Wathne et al., 2001).  
Data Collection  
An appointment for a personal interview was made with each informant who 
agreed to participate in the study. Two postgraduate students administered the conjoint 
experiment as part of their MSc thesis activity. 
The contractors were presented with a full profile method to add realism to the 
conjoint task (Carroll  and Green, 1995; Wathne et al., 2001). Each of the 16 scenarios 
was presented to the managers with verbal descriptions on cards. In addition to the 16 
cards, the managers were given a short description of the context for decision making 
and the four factors to be considered. As such, each card represented a bid containing 
the focal variables and provided a very realistic task. The managers were asked to rank 
each scenario from 1 to 16, where 1 was the bid from the supplier that most probably 
would be preferred for the project. Next, the managers were asked to rate each 
hypothetical bid on an eleven-point scale that indicated the likelihood of accepting the 
offer from the supplier, where 0 = “very unlikely to accept the offer” and 10 = “very 
likely to accept the offer”. Similar to the study of Wathne et al. (2001) the final 
regression analysis used the rating measure while the ranking task was used to 
facilitate the rating measure (Alwin and Krosnick, 1985). 
Results 
The size of the contractors in the study varied from 4 to 6000 employees with 
150 as the median size. The background questions “Quality is critical when 
purchasing plumbing products and services” and “We are dependent on quality from 
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all suppliers in the supply chain” obtained mean values of 5.63 and 6.68 
respectively on a seven-point scale, supporting the underlying assumptions of quality 
when selecting plumbing subcontractors. 
The hypotheses were tested by estimating the relative importance of the factors 
and by estimating an ordinary least square model. The importance weights were 
computed by dividing each factor’s part-worth range by the sum of all part worth 
ranges. Table 1 shows the aggregated importance weights for both the ranking and 
rating task. 
Table 1 here 
The table shows that buyers consider price the most important variable, 
followed by previous experience, certification, and company brand credibility. 
Furthermore, the table shows that the aggregated reputation variables contribute 61 
percent to the choice made while price contributes 39 percent based on the ranking 
task. The rating task produced similar results with even more emphasis on price. 
However, in interpreting the importance weights it is important to take into account 
their dependence on the number of factors and the specific factor levels included in the 
study, as in all conjoint studies. 
When estimating the regression model an effect-coding scheme representing 
the different levels of the factors was used (Cohen and Cohen, 1983). In this scheme, 
the first level of each factor (e.g., no previous experience with key personnel at the 
supplier) is coded -1, and the other (e.g., positive experiences) as +1. Interactions were 
defined by multiplicative cross-product terms between the relevant variables (Green 
and deSarbo, 1979; Wathne et al., 2001). Since the dependent variable and one 
moderator (quality sensitiveness) use scaled items, these scales were checked for 
normality, reported in Table 2. The values are within the acceptable ranges to proceed 
with the regression analyses. When performing regression analysis on conjoint data by 
following the method as described, each informant in our study produces 16 cases. 
The 19 informants then produce a total of 304 cases. The model involved estimating a 
buyer’s tendency to choose a supplier’s offer as a function of prior experience, 
company brand credibility, certification, price, the interactions between price and the 
reputation variables, and between price and buyers’ quality sensitiveness. Before, 
estimating the interaction term between price and quality sensitiveness, the quality 
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sensitiveness scale was mean-centered (e.g. , Homburg et al. 2010). Table 3 
shows the estimated standardized and unstandardized coefficients, and associated t- 
and VIF-statistics. 
Table 2 and 3 here 
The results in Table 3 indicate the potential threat of multicollinearity to be 
low. The model explains a satisfactory amount of variance (adjusted R2 = .58). The 
results show that previous experience with the supplier has a significant and positive 
effect on the buyer’s likelihood of selecting the supplier (t = 11.64), thus supporting 
H1. Similarly, company brand credibility has a significant and positive effect on 
supplier choice (t = 2.24), providing support for H2. Consistent with H3, certification 
shows a positive and significant effect (t = 5.79). As expected, price has a significant 
and negative effect on the likelihood of selecting the supplier, which supports H4 (t = -
15.47). Turning to the predicted interaction effects in H5, there is no significant effects 
between previous experience and price (t = -.77), and company brand credibility and 
price (t = .33), while the effect between certification and price is significant and 
negative (t = -1.70),3 giving partial support to the predictions of H5. As Table 3 
shows, the moderator variable has no significant effect on the dependent variable. 
However, consistent with H6 risk of monetary loss caused by poor supplier quality 
moderates price positively and significantly (t = 2.27). 
Discussion 
Implications for theory 
Competitive bidding is a market-based principle for supplier selection and is 
widely used even when selecting subcontractors with experience attributes. Although 
theoretical (e.g., Liebeskind and Rumelt, 1989; Rao and Monroe, 1996) and empirical 
(e.g., Hatush and Skitmore, 1998; Holt et al., 1995) studies advice buyers to be 
cautious about focusing too strongly on price when purchasing experience services, 
the results show that price is the single most important variable for selecting 
subcontractor in the context examined. As such, this finding corroborates the 
significance of price found in previous studies on supplier selection in B2B markets 
                                                 
3 Because of the directional hypotheses, one-tailed tests are used (e.g., Rokkan et al., 2003; Schroeder et 
al., 1986; Wathne et al., 2001). 
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(e.g., Bendixen et al., 2004; Håkansson and Wootz, 1975; Wuyts et al., 
2009; Zablah et. al., 2010). However, as noted, optimal subcontractor choice involves 
balancing quality and price (e.g., Darvish et al., 2009; Hatush and Skitmore, 1998; 
Plank and Ferrin, 2002). The fact that the combined effect of the reputation variables 
is higher than the effect of the price variable suggests that buyers might be aware of 
emphasizing price too much when selecting subcontractors where experience 
attributes play an important role.  
The results show considerable differences between the reputation variables. 
Specifically, customers attached more weight to prior experience than to the other 
reputation variables. Relatively speaking, company brand credibility supported by 
strong references did not seem to be an important factor when choosing a supplier. 
This result parallels similar findings on branding in B2B contexts (e.g., Bendixen et 
al., 2004; Wuyts et al., 2009; Zablah et al., 2010). When interpreting the results, it is 
premature to disregard the significance of company brand name. Supplier selection 
research points out the important distinction between the consideration and final 
choice stage and shows that the effects of selection criteria vary by the stages in the 
selection process (Plank and Ferrin, 2002; Wuyts et al. 2009). While price and 
previous experience is important in the final choice, company brand, references and 
other reputation variables are shown to be far more prevalent in the consideration 
stage (Blombäck and Axelsson, 2007; Wuyts et al. 2009).  
Consider next the interaction effects between price and the reputation 
variables. Although the regressions did not show the expected negative effects 
between price, and previous experience and brand credibility, the non-significant 
interaction effects indicate that when the supplier builds a reputation for quality, the 
buyer will not pay a price premium to a reputable supplier for fulfilment of quality 
expectations. Rather, the supplier puts its reputation at stake in case of quality 
cheating (Rao, 1993; Rao and Bergen, 1992). Therefore, the supplier will receive a 
normal, competitive price for the required quality level. The negative interaction 
between certification of corporate social responsibility and price, as predicted, is also 
noteworthy, suggesting that the effect of low price is higher for certified suppliers. 
This finding makes sense when considering the buyer’s decision problem. Where 
buyers can chose between two low price bids, one from a certified and one from a 
non-certified supplier, whom do they choose? In the case of the certified supplier, the 
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buyer has an assurance that the low price is legally achieved, which might 
not be the case for the non-certified supplier. Taken together, the findings indicate that 
the presence of reputation variables makes a low price more trustworthy, and so 
enables the market mechanism to work when experience attributes are present 
(Akerlof, 1970). As such, the results indicate that in bidding contexts in B2B markets, 
the reputation variables may enhance rather than reduce buyers’ price sensitivity 
opposed to findings in consumer goods research (e.g. Erdem et al., 2002, 2006). 
Compared to findings in the B2B brand equity literature the findings might be 
puzzling. The mere impact of the reputation variables suggests a brand equity effect as 
found in studies not accounting for price (e.g., Gordon et al., 1993; Roberts and 
Merrilees, 2007; van Riel et. al., 2005; Zablah et al., 2010). However, other definitions 
of brand equity imply price premiums to suppliers with a reputation for quality (e.g, 
Aaker, 1991) as shown in empirical B2B studies (e.g., Bendixen et. al., 2004; Firth 
1993; Hutton 1997; Persson, 2010). In contrast, this study suggests that suppliers with 
a reputation for quality will not receive price premiums, in line with findings in the 
economics of information literature (e.g., Rao and Bergen 1992). One explanation 
may reside in the distinction between price premiums and premium prices. As noted, a 
price premium is a price considerably above the competitive price for a specific 
quality level, which the buyer pays to the supplier for fulfilling its quality promise 
(e.g., Klein and Leffler, 1981). A premium price is a higher price for higher quality 
but still a competitive price for that quality level (e.g., Rao and Bergen, 1992). 
Without making those distinctions previous studies might have measured premium 
prices rather than price premiums. Still, reputable companies show superior financial 
performance (e.g., Roberts and Dowling, 2002). The perspective of Ailawadi et al. 
(2003) might add to our understanding of the brand equity effect by their suggestions 
of brand equity as composed by volume premiums and price premiums resulting in 
revenue premiums. 
Finally, while buyers generally will not pay price premiums to reputable 
suppliers in the choice situation the positive interaction effect between quality 
sensitiveness and price indicates that quality sensitive buyers are willing to pay a price 
premium in order to receive high-quality services and avoid moral hazard after 
supplier has been chosen, even in a bidding situation. When inferior quality from the 
supplier might cause a loss to the buyer, receiving high quality really matters. 
 19 
Therefore, buyers are more willing to pay a price premium to keep the 
supplier honest, consistent with the findings of Rao and Bergen (1992). 
Implications for management  
Selection of subcontractors through competitive bidding in project markets 
represents managerial challenges to contractors and to subcontractors. Contractors 
face the problem of selecting subcontractors with the appropriate quality while high-
quality subcontractors meet the challenge of distinguishing themselves from low-
quality competitors.  
Due to the short-term nature of projects, subcontractors accuse contractors of 
focusing on price with negative consequences for quality, profits and margins (e.g., 
Hatush and Skinmore, 1998). Brand equity literature suggests that engaging in 
reputation building activities to differentiate themselves from competitors and to 
charge price premiums enable suppliers in competitive markets to increase their 
profitability (Aaker 1991; Bendixen et al., 2004; Firth, 1993). Similarly, the 
Norwegian construction industry has suggested brand and reputation building as 
profitability enhancing strategies (Espelien and Reve, 2007). The results do not 
support such a strategy if achieving price premiums is an objective. On the contrary, 
the findings suggest that reputation makes low prices more trustworthy. This result 
does not mean that suppliers should not invest in building a reputation for quality. 
Rather, the findings demonstrate that buyers generally prefer suppliers with a quality 
reputation. Suppliers should therefore have an interest in building a quality reputation 
for two reasons: (1) a quality reputation should increase the likelihood of coming on 
contractors’ shortlist (e.g., Plank and Ferrin, 2002) and (2) reputation for quality 
generally increases the likelihood of being selected. Findings from the qualitative 
prestudy support these recommendations. When contractors consider potential 
subcontractors, they assess subcontractors’ previous performance on timelines in 
deliveries, quality of key personnel, ability to keep budgets, documentation of 
financial situation, and routines for quality management. For new subcontractors, 
references from similar projects for reputable contractors are keys. Price is seldom an 
important issue at the prequalification stage, but increases in significance in the final 
choice (Wuyts et al., 2009). Thus, suppliers with a strong reputation should 
outcompete their less reputed competitors and achieve profitability through a volume 
premium effect (Ailawadi et. al., 2003; Rao, 1993).  
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Finally, as the findings indicate, suppliers wanting to earn price 
premiums are wiser to target the quality sensitive segment of the market. One strategy 
might then be to support the price premium with a warranty. This strategy puts future 
costs at risk and is not dependent on repeat business to act as a credible signal of 
quality (Kirmani and Rao, 2000). 
Limitations and Further Research 
Some limitations of this study exist. Firstly, although a conjoint design 
produces multiple cases, the underlying sample size is limited. In addition to the 
limited sample, we cannot disregard influences from potential idiosyncrasies of the 
Norwegian building industry such as norms, standards, regulations, and buyer 
behavior. The sample size reflects a basic problem to B2B-research in markets with a 
small total population. However, previous conjoint studies demonstrate that even 
small underlying samples can produce valid results (Wathne et al., 2001). One 
problem with small sample sizes is potential lack of variation. Despite consistent 
findings compared to previous B2B branding and supplier selection studies (e.g., 
Bendixen et al., 2004; Rao and Bergen, 1992; Zablah et al., 2010), this study should 
still be regarded as preliminary and a basis for further validation on larger samples, 
with different methods, in other countries, and in other industries where asymmetric 
information prevails. One promising avenue for validating the findings might be to 
conduct in-depth examinations of winning bids from specific projects and compare the 
buyers’ emphasis on the various selection criteria - price and perceived reputation 
variables included - relative to the losing bids. 
Secondly, this study’s findings indicate that quality sensitive buyers will pay 
suppliers a price premium when poor quality may have negative economic 
consequences. On the other hand, the findings also indicate that buyers will not pay 
price premiums to suppliers with a quality reputation but only a competitive price 
commensurate with the suppliers’ quality level. These findings are in line with 
empirical research in information economics (Rao and Bergen, 1992). In contrast, 
B2B brand equity studies indicate that suppliers with a reputation for quality, i.e. high 
brand equity are able to charge price premiums (e.g., Bendixen et al., 2004; Hutton, 
1997; Persson, 2010). Unfortunately, empirical studies on price premiums and 
reputation in the economics of information perspective barely exist. Studies, exploring 
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the seemingly contradictory findings between the two perspectives should 
provide promising avenues for further research. 
Finally, this study does not examine quality per se, although quality was an 
underlying assumption for supplier selection, as emphasized in the conjoint task and 
supported by the scores on background questions. Quality and moral hazard are 
serious problems for end-consumers in the construction industry. This study provides 
some insights into mechanisms that may reduce quality debasement caused by 
asymmetric information. However, as Klein and Leffler (1981) argue, when 
repurchase is uncertain, there is motivation for sellers to undersupply quality under a 
normal, competitive price. Therefore, studies examining whether bidding practices and 
strong price focus contribute to quality problems for experience services despite 
reputation building attempts might then be promising avenues for further research. 
Particularly, suppliers’ quality reactions to price pressure and to variations in buyer 
behavior, from strongly adversarial and short-term to cooperative and long-term 
oriented should provide insight to trade-offs between price, quality and reputation. 
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Scenario and Measures for the Conjoint Task 
The following scenario and factors describe the conjoint task presented to the 
informants for this study. 
Assume the following situation: 
Your company is main contractor for a construction project in the Oslo-region. 
The project encompasses the construction of a new residential building comprising 30 
self-owned apartments. Your task is to select suppliers to this project. Specifically, 
you should select a supplier for the complete water, ventilation, and sanitary 
(plumbing) solutions. 
As the overall contractor, you have the total responsibility for the project and it 
is important to keep to the due date for completion, the budgeted total costs for the 
project, and to minimize defects after the building has been completed. 
Consider each card as representing a total offer, which includes products and 
installations. This study focuses on four factors. Keep other factors that might 
influence your choice of plumbing supplier as neutral as possible. 
You will receive 16 cards each describing factors to consider in your choice of 
supplier. Regard each card as an offer from a supplier. 
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Factors 
Previous Experience  
• Your company has no experience with key person(s) at this plumbing 
supplier from previous projects. 
• Your company has positive experience with key person(s) at this 
plumbing supplier from previous projects. 
Company Brand Credibility  
• The supplier has done similar projects for less well-known contractors such 
as… (the names of two fictitious contractors were given as examples)   
• The supplier has done similar projects for well-known contractors, such as… 
(the names of two large and reputable contractors were given as examples). 
Certification  
• The supplier is not a member of StartBANK (the construction industry’s 
CSR certification arrangement).  
• The supplier is a member of StartBANK. 
Price  
• The supplier quotes NOK 1,500,000 for the project.  
• The supplier quotes NOK 1,650,000 for the project 
. 
The first factor, experience, refers to the buyer’s experience with key personnel 
at the supplier (Shapiro, 1983) since the persons are key influencers on service quality 
(Mishra, Heide, and Cort, 1998; Wuyts et al., 2009). Supplier references from other 
contractors on similar projects provide information to inform the second factor, 
company brand credibility (Blombäck and Axelsson, 2007; Helm and Salminen, 
2010). A Google search ensures that the fictitious names measuring the low level do 
not actually exist.   
The third factor, certification, described the membership in the Norwegian 
Construction Industry’s certification program of corporate social responsibility. The 
fourth factor, price, refers to the suppliers offer for a complete water, heating, and 
sanitary installation project on a residential construction project described in the 
conjoint scenarios. Field interviews with representatives from large and experienced 
contractors of residential building assisted in deciding levels. The low level describes 
a normal price offer for this type of project. Information from the field interviews 
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indicated that the profit margin on projects as described in the conjoint 
instruction is normally 5 percent. As a result, we decided to set the high level at a 10 
percent premium. 
Moderator Variable 
The moderator variable was anchored by 1 = completely disagree and 7 = 
completely agree. 
Quality sensitiveness 
We will suffer significant losses if the quality supplied by a supplier of 







Conjoint Factor Importance Weights 




Previous Experience 35 34 
Company Brand Credibility  8  7 
Certification 17 16 




Descriptive Statistics of Scale Items 
 Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Dependent variable: 
Likelihood of 
choice of supplier 
(Anchors 0 - 10) 
5.42 3.23 -.10 -1.25 
Moderator variable: 
Loss by poor 
quality 
(Anchors 1 – 7) 




Dependent variable: Likelihood of accepting offer from the subcontractor  







Previous Experience  
(H1 – supported) 
1.40 .44 11.64** 1.00 
Company brand credibility  
(H2 – supported) 
.27 .08 2.24** 1.00 
Certification  
(H3 – supported) 
.70 .22 5.79** 1.00 
Price  
(H4 – supported) 
-1.86 -.58 -15.47** 1.00 
Loss by poor quality  
(quality sensitiveness) 
(Moderator) 
-.03 -.01 -.35 1.00 
Price x experience  
(H5a – not supported) 
-.09 -.03 -.77 1.00 
Price x brand credibility  
(H5b –  not supported) 
.04 .01 .33 1.00 
Price x certification  
(H5c – supported) 
-.20 -.06 -1.70* 1.00 
Price x loss by poor quality 
(H6 – supported) 
.21 .09 2.27** 1.00 
R2 adjusted = .58  
 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
Notes: Because of the directional hypotheses, one-tailed tests are used. 
